Tomasz Dziwak v. Atty Gen USA by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-29-2013 
Tomasz Dziwak v. Atty Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Tomasz Dziwak v. Atty Gen USA" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 1319. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1319 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3756 
___________ 
 
TOMASZ MARIUSZ DZIWAK, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A047-834-237) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Amiena Khan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 2, 2013 
Before:  SCIRICA, VANASKIE and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  January 29, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Tomasz Mariusz Dziwak petitions for review of a final order of removal.  For the 
following reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 Dziwak, a native and citizen of Poland, was admitted to the United States as a 
lawful permanent resident in 2001.  He pleaded guilty in 2005 to sexual assault in the 
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second degree and endangering the welfare of a child in the third degree, in violation of 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:14-2c(4), 2C:24-4a.  The charges resulted from Dziwak, who was 
twenty years old at the time, having sexual relations with a fifteen-year-old girl at a party.  
He was sentenced to serve 364 days in a county jail on the weekends and to three years of 
probation, and he was required to register as a sex offender.  Dziwak applied for post-
conviction relief (“PCR”) based on Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), arguing 
that his counsel did not adequately inform him of the immigration consequences of 
pleading guilty.  His PCR petition was denied in May 2011. 
 Meanwhile, immigration proceedings began, and Dziwak was charged as 
removable for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and an 
aggravated felony.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  He conceded 
being removable as charged, but sought withholding of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3).1
                                              
1 Dziwak withdrew his requests for asylum and protection under the Convention Against 
Torture.  He was deemed to be ineligible for cancellation of removal due to his 
aggravated felony conviction. 
  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) granted several continuances to allow 
Dziwak to pursue post-conviction relief in state court, which resulted in the proceedings 
being postponed from April 9, 2010 through May 25, 2011.  At the May 26, 2011 
hearing, Dziwak informed the IJ that his PCR petition had been denied and requested a 
continuance while he pursued an appeal.  The IJ denied the request and the hearing went 
forward. 
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 Dziwak testified that he feared returning to Poland because he believed the victim 
had extended family there who would harm him.  This fear was apparently linked to a 
single threat made by the victim’s brother about five years before the immigration 
hearing to the effect that he would beat Dziwak if he ever saw him near his sister.  
Dziwak also testified that he feared returning to Poland because he would have nowhere 
to go and no job.  The IJ found Dziwak credible, but denied withholding of removal, 
determining that his testimony failed to show that it was more likely than not that his life 
or freedom would be threatened in Poland. 
 The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Dziwak’s appeal, 
concluding that the denial of the request for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion.  
Dziwak’s speculation that his PCR appeal would be successful was insufficient to 
establish good cause for further delay.  The BIA further concluded that Dziwak had not 
shown prejudice from the denial because there was no indication that he had prevailed in 
having his criminal convictions vacated.  Regarding the denial of withholding of removal, 
the BIA determined that Dziwak had failed to show that his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of a protected ground, nor had he shown that the Polish 
government would be unable or unwilling to protect him from the individuals he feared. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  Although we generally lack 
jurisdiction to review a final order of removal against an alien who is removable for 
having committed an aggravated felony, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), we retain 
jurisdiction  to review constitutional claims and questions of law.  See 8 U.S.C. 
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§ 1252(a)(2)(D).  Dziwak argues that the IJ’s denial of his request for a continuance to 
pursue an appeal of his PCR petition violated his right to due process.  We construe 
Dziwak’s argument, cursory as it is, as making a constitutional claim, despite the 
Government’s argument to the contrary.  See Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 163 n.5 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (noting that a claim of error regarding the denial of a continuance may be 
construed as a due process claim).2
 Nevertheless, we perceive no error in the BIA’s decision to affirm the denial of a 
continuance because Dziwak has not shown that he was prejudiced by it.  “‘[D]ue process 
challenges to deportation proceedings require an initial showing of substantial 
prejudice.’”  Khan v. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 236 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Anwar v. 
INS, 116 F.3d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1997)).  Dziwak’s argument is premised on the belief 
that his PCR appeal will be successful.  But when the IJ denied a continuance, Dziwak’s 
PCR petition had been denied on the merits,
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2 In addition, we note that the BIA treated it as a due process claim.  Joint Appendix 
(“J.A.”) at 4. 
 and the likelihood of success of his appeal 
was speculative.  Moreover, the pendency of a post-conviction motion does not negate 
the finality of a conviction for immigration purposes.  Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 
196, 198-99 (3d Cir. 2008).  Most critical to the analysis regarding prejudice, Dziwak has 
not indicated that his PCR appeal was successful and that his conviction was overturned, 
 
3 The PCR court rejected Dziwak’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in part due to 
the fact that he had been informed by the court during his plea colloquy that he ran the 
risk of being deported as a consequence of the conviction.  J.A. at 141.   
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a result which seems unlikely given that the Supreme Court of New Jersey has decided 
that Padilla does not apply retroactively.  See State v. Gaitan, 37 A.3d 1089, 1107 (N.J. 
2012). 
   Dziwak also argues that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s decision that he was 
not entitled to withholding of removal.  To be entitled to withholding of removal, an 
alien must show that it is more likely than not that his “life or freedom would be 
threatened . . . because of [his] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Li v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 
136, 140-41 (3d Cir. 2011).  Here, Dziwak contends that he established that it is more 
likely than not that his life or freedom will be threatened if he returns to Poland with 
evidence of the threat from the victim’s brother and a State Department report indicating 
that there is police misconduct and a high unemployment rate in Poland.  The 
Government contends that we lack jurisdiction to review this claim because Dziwak’s 
arguments “address only the question of what is likely to happen” if he returns to 
Poland.  Resp’t’s. Br. at 20.  We agree. 
 The IJ found Dziwak credible, but determined that “the conjecture stated by 
[Dziwak] and a series of suppositions strung together as to what may occur if [he] is 
returned to Poland is not sufficient to meet . . . the more stringent more likely than not 
standard.”  J.A. at 16.  Thus, the IJ concluded that Dziwak failed to establish that what 
he feared was more likely than not to happen, which is the factual part of the mixed 
question of whether there is a likelihood of a threat to life or freedom.  Cf. Kaplun v. 
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Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that, in likelihood of torture 
inquiries, what is likely to happen is the factual aspect, and whether that amounts to 
torture is the legal aspect).  Although Dziwak’s brief conflates the two parts of the 
inquiry, it is clear from the context of this case that his arguments regarding the evidence 
must go directly to the factual question of what is more likely than not to happen – and 
not whether what he fears amounts to a threat to his life or freedom – because Dziwak 
never cleared the factual hurdle in the immigration proceedings.  As noted above, our 
review in this case is limited by statute to constitutional claims and questions of law.  8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  Because Dziwak’s second argument challenges the IJ’s factual 
finding, we lack jurisdiction to consider it.4
 For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
                                              
4 We note that even if we did have jurisdiction to consider the argument, Dziwak has 
done nothing more than briefly list evidence the IJ already considered.  Furthermore, the 
question of whether Dziwak established that it is more likely than not that his life or 
freedom will be threatened is not determinative at this point because he has not 
challenged the BIA’s determination that he failed to meet other criteria for withholding of 
removal.  See J.A. at 5.  He has not shown that any threat to him would be on account of 
an enumerated ground, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), or that the Polish government would be 
unable or unwilling to protect him from the victim’s family.  Cf. Kibinda v. Att’y Gen., 
477 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that one of the criteria for asylum is a showing 
that the persecution is committed by the government or by forces the government is 
unable or unwilling to control). 
 
